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Abstract: I study a reputation model in which a patient player privately observes a persistent state that affects
his myopic opponents’ payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same (possi-
bly mixed) action over time. The main result is a characterization of the set of environments under which the
patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff func-
tion. My result implies that small perturbations to a pure commitment action can lead to a discontinuous change
in the patient player’s equilibrium payoff. The main technical contribution is to use martingale techniques to
construct a non-stationary strategy under which the patient player can avoid signaling negative information
about the state while at the same time, matching the long-run frequency of his actions to the mixed commit-
ment action and convincing his opponents that his action is close to the commitment action in almost all periods.
Keywords: reputation, interdependent values, supermartingales, Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality.
1 Introduction
Reputations are powerful tools to overcome lack-of-commitment problems. This idea is formalized by Fuden-
berg and Levine (1989, 1992), who show that patient players (e.g., firms, sellers) are guaranteed to receive
high payoffs by building reputations. Their reputation results apply to all equilibria, do not depend on the pa-
tient player’s payoff function and his opponents’ beliefs about his payoff function. These robust properties are
desirable in economic applications since researchers may not know which equilibrium the market participants
coordinate on, and in many complex situations, may misspecify the firms’ objective functions or the market’s
beliefs about their objective functions.
This paper examines whether these robust reputation results extend to interdependent value environments.
To fix ideas, consider the example of a toy company that has private information about the safety of its prod-
ucts (e.g., lead content in its paint) which is correlated with the quality of its downstream manufacturers. Its
customers’ willingness to pay depends not only on the company’s observable effort (e.g., the design of its toys,
∗Department of Economics, Northwestern University. This article is based on Chapter 1 of my dissertation at MIT, which is split
into the current paper (Chapter 1.3) and “Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values” (Chapter 1.4). I am indebted to Daron
Acemoglu, Drew Fudenberg, Juuso Toikka, and AlexWolitzky for guidance and support. I thank Heski Bar-Isaac, Daniel Clark, Martin
Cripps, Joyee Deb, Mehmet Ekmekci, Jack Fanning, Yuhta Ishii, Elliot Lipnowski, Qingmin Liu, Shuo Liu, Lucas Maestri, Marcin
Pe¸ski, Bruno Strulovici, Can Urgun, Nicolas Vieille, Geyu Yang and my seminar participants for helpful comments. Errors are mine.
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its advertisements and customer service), but also on its product safety. However, it is hard for consumers to
observe product safety.1 As a result, they rely primarily on the company’s observable effort to make inferences
about safety. The company’s incentive to establish a reputation for supplying high-quality designs interacts
with its incentive to signal product safety, which introduces new economic forces that cannot be captured by
existing private-value reputation models (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992).
I study a repeated game in which a patient player 1 (e.g., firm) interacts with an infinite sequence of myopic
player 2s (e.g., consumers), arriving one in each period and each plays the game only once. Different from
private-value reputation models, player 1 privately observes the realization of a payoff-relevant state (e.g.,
product safety or durability) that is constant over time and affects both players’ stage-game payoffs, in addition
to knowing whether he is strategic or committed. Strategic player 1 maximizes his discounted average payoff.
Committed player 1 mechanically plays the same commitment action in every period, which can potentially be
mixed and can depend on the realized state. Player 2s can observe all the actions taken in the past.
The main difference from Pei (2020) is that the committed long-run player can play mixed actions. This
is not only a robustness exercise, but also captures a number of economically relevant scenarios. Under the
interpretation that the committed long-run player is ethical, his preference may depend on variables other than
the persistent state and players’ actions. For example, an ethical firm also cares about its workers’ well-being,
and commits to provide good service unless its workers are sick (in which case forcing them to work hard is
unethical). When this random shock (whether workers are sick or healthy) is i.i.d. over time and is the ethical
firm’s private information, the ethical firm behaves as if it is committed to provide good service with a certain
probability. Allowing the commitment types to play mixed actions is also a first step to study the interaction
between imperfect monitoring and interdependent values. In particular, players 2s can only observe the realized
pure action, which is a noisy signal that can statistically identify player 1’s mixed action.
Theorem 1 characterizes the set of interdependent value environments under which the following reputa-
tion result in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) extends: a patient player 1’s equilibrium payoff is at least his
commitment payoff regardless of his stage-game payoff function. My result implies that securing commitment
payoffs from mixed actions requires more demanding conditions than securing commitment payoffs from pure
actions. I also show that small perturbations to a pure commitment action can lead to a discontinuous change in
the patient player’s equilibrium payoff (Theorem 2). This stands in contrast to the private-value reputation mod-
1The safety of products is a classic example of credence quality defined in Darby and Karni (1973), which refers to aspects of
quality that cannot be observed by consumers even after purchase. This contrasts to experience quality defined in Nelson (1970), which
refers to aspects of quality that can be observed by consumers after purchase but not before. In the toy industry, the design of toys (e.g.,
whether toys are fun to play with) belongs to the category of experience quality, since parents can observe whether their kids enjoy
playing with the toy after they bought them. The safety of toys which includes the lead content in its paint, belongs to the category of
credence quality, since the impact of lead on a child’s health is long-lasting, and cannot be discovered until much later in life.
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els of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), in which such discontinuity cannot arise under generic parameter
values (e.g., player 2 has a strict best reply against each of player 1’s pure actions).
Intuitively, when a commitment action is nontrivially mixed, some pure actions in the support of this mixed
commitment action can be played with higher probability by some strategic type than by the commitment type,
in which case playing these pure actions triggers adverse inferences about the payoff-relevant state. When the
state is persistent and directly affects player 2’s best reply against the commitment action, player 2’s belief
about the state in any given period can have a significant impact on a patient player 1’s continuation value.
The above reasoning unveils another difference between private and interdependent values, that when player
2’s best reply against the commitment action depends nontrivially on the state, player 1 cannot secure his mixed
commitment payoff by imitating the commitment type. Instead, he needs to cherry-pick actions in the support
of the mixed commitment action in order to avoid triggering negative inferences about the state. To the best of
my knowledge, this observation is novel in the reputation literature,2 since most of the existing results (include
Pei 2020) are shown by computing a patient player’s payoff when he imitates some commitment type.
Nevertheless, cherry-picking actions raises two concerns. First, the long-run player may end up playing
low-payoff actions too frequently, in which case his expected payoff falls short of his commitment payoff.
Second, given that the long-run player does not necessarily play the commitment action in every period, he may
fail to convince his opponents that the commitment action will be played in the future.
To address these concerns, I establish a learning result (Proposition 2), that for every strategy profile, a
patient player 1 can find a deviation that achieves three goals simultaneously. First, in every period, player 2
has an incentive to play the desirable best reply against the commitment action under her posterior belief about
the state. Second, the discounted average frequency of player 1’s action is close to the mixed commitment
action under every pure strategy in the support of this deviation. Third, in expectation, player 2s believe that
player 1’s action is close to his mixed commitment action in all except for a bounded number of periods.
My main technical contribution is to use a combination of the Doob’s upcrossing inequality, the central limit
theorem for triangular sequences, and the entropy techniques in Gossner (2011) to construct such a deviation
(Section 4). My approach is also applicable to interdependent value games with imperfect monitoring, in which
case I derive a lower bound on a patient player’s equilibrium payoff that applies to all equilibria and all of his
stage-game payoff functions (Section 6). Another technical contribution is to construct low-payoff equilibria
when the conditions in Theorem 1 are violated (Section 5).
2Evans and Thomas (1997) and Deb and Ishii (2019) construct commitment types that play non-stationary strategies, and show that
a patient informed player can secure his commitment payoff by imitating those non-stationary commitment types. Their results are
conceptually different from my observation, that all commitment types play stationary strategies, but the strategic-type patient player
needs to behave differently from the commitment type in order to secure his commitment payoff.
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Related Literature: Together with Pei (2020), this paper contributes to the literature on reputation formation
by highlighting the tradeoff faced by a reputation-building player in interdependent value environments, which
is between building his reputation for commitment and signaling the payoff-relevant state.
My results in this paper evaluate the robustness of the insights in Fudenberg and Levine (1989,1992) when
the short-run players cannot perfectly monitor whether the long-run player has honored his commitment, i.e.,
when his commitment action is nontrivially mixed. Different from private value environments, small pertur-
bations to a pure commitment action can lead to a discontinuous change in the long-run player’s equilibrium
payoff. Different from games in which all commitment types play pure actions, the way in which the long-run
player guarantees his commitment payoff is by behaving differently from the commitment type.
Conceptually, my analysis unveils the challenges to build reputations when the uninformed players’ learning
is confounded. In mymodel, confounded learning is caused by interdependent values: even though the informed
player can convince his opponents about his future actions, he may not teach them how to best reply when their
payoff functions depend on a persistent state.
This is related to the recent works of Deb and Ishii (2019) and Yang (2019), in which confounded learning
is caused by uncertainty in the monitoring structure.3 Different from the current paper, Yang (2019) focuses
on private value environments and identifies sufficient conditions under which the patient player can secure his
commitment payoff. Deb and Ishii (2019) allow for uncertainty in the monitoring structure and interdependent
values, and assume that for every pair of states θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, there exists α1 ∈ ∆(A1) such that the distribution
over public signals under (θ, α1) is different from that under (θ
′, α′1) for every α
′
1 ∈ ∆(A1).
Their state identification condition is violated in my model as well as other models of repeated incomplete
information games and repeated signaling games such as Aumann and Maschler (1995), Hart (1985), Kaya
(2009), Ho¨rner, Lovo and Tomala (2011), and Pe¸ski (2014). In those papers and mine, the uninformed players
can learn about the informed player’s type only through the latter’s actions, not through other informative
exogenous signals. In practice, Deb and Ishii (2019)’s informational assumption fits into applications where
informative signals about the state arrive frequently, as for example, when the state is the performance of
vehicles, mobile phones, and so on. By contrast, my informational assumption fits into applications where
signals other than the informed player’s actions are unlikely to arrive for a long time, as for example, when the
state is the credence quality of products (Darby and Karni 1973), such as a product’s safety and durability.
My work is related to Ekmekci and Maestri (2019) who also study reputation building under interdepen-
dent values. Different from the current paper, Ekmekci and Maestri (2019) focus on stopping games (i.e., the
3Related ideas on confounded learning also appear in Wolitzky (2011), who studies reputational bargaining with non-transparent
commitment types. His reputation failure result requires that the uninformed player being long-lived and the commitment types playing
non-stationary strategies, none of which is needed for my results.
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uninformed player’s action choice is binary, either she stops the game irreversibly or she continues) and obtain
sharp predictions on the informed player’s payoff when monitoring is imperfect and the uninformed player is
long-lived. My results are complementary to theirs by highlighting the challenges to build reputations when the
uninformed players can switch actions over time. Their model fits into applications such as a committee decid-
ing when to irreversibly grant a worker tenure. My model fits into decentralized markets, in which consumers
can freely choose which product to buy regardless of their predecessors’ choices.
2 Model
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2.... A long-lived player 1 (he, e.g., a seller) with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1)
interacts with an infinite sequence of short-lived player 2s (she, e.g., consumer), arriving one in each period and
each plays the game only once. In period t, players simultaneously choose their actions (a1,t, a2,t) ∈ A1 ×A2.
Player 1 has perfectly persistent private information about (1) a payoff-relevant state θ ∈ Θ, and (2) whether
he is strategic or committed. If player 1 is strategic, then he can flexibly choose his actions in order to maximize
his discounted average payoff. If player 1 is committed, then he mechanically follows one of the several
commitment plans. A typical commitment plan is denoted by γ : Θ → ∆(A1), according to which the
committed player plays γ(θ) ∈ ∆(A1) in every period when the realized state is θ.
Let Γ be an exogenous set of feasible commitment plans that the committed player 1 can follow. Let
A∗1 ≡ {α1 ∈ ∆(A1)| there exist γ ∈ Γ and θ ∈ Θ such that γ(θ) = α1} ⊂ ∆(A1), (2.1)
be the set of commitment actions. Intuitively, α∗1 belongs to A
∗
1 if and only if it is played in some state under
some feasible commitment plan. Let γ∗ stand for player 1 being strategic, and let
µ ∈ ∆
(
Θ×
(
{γ∗} ∪ Γ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
player 1’s characteristics
)
(2.2)
be player 2’s prior belief, which is a joint distribution of the state and player 1’s characteristics, namely,
whether he is strategic or committed, and if he is committed, which feasible plan in Γ does he follow. I make
the following assumption, which is standard in the study of repeated games:
Assumption 1. Θ, Γ, A1, and A2 are finite sets, |A1|, |A2| ≥ 2, and µ has full support.
Let ht ≡ {a1,s, a2,s}
t−1
s=0 ∈ H
t be a public history. Let H ≡
⋃+∞
t=0 H
t be the set of public histories. Player
1’s private history consists of the public history and his persistent private information. Player 2’s private history
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coincides with the public history. Let σ1 ≡ (σθ)θ∈Θ be strategic player 1’s strategy, with σθ : H → ∆(A1).
Let σ2 : H → ∆(A2) be player 2’s strategy. Let σ ≡
(
σ1, σ2
)
be a strategy profile, with σ ∈ Σ.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, player i’s stage-game payoff in period t is ui(θ, a1,t, a2,t), which is naturally extended to
mixed actions. This formulation allows for interdependent values since u2 depends on θ, which is player 1’s
private information. For every φ ∈ ∆(Θ), α1 ∈ ∆(A1), and u2 : Θ×A1 ×A2 → R, let
BR2(φ, α1|u2) ≡ arg max
a2∈A2
{∑
θ∈Θ
∑
a1∈A1
φ(θ)α1(a1)u2(θ, a1, a2)
}
, (2.3)
be the set of pure best replies against α1 when the state distribution is φ. Abusing notation, I use BR2(θ, α1|u2)
to denote player 2’s pure best replies against α1 when the state is θ. To simplify the exposition, my results are
stated under the following generic assumption, which will be relaxed in Online Appendix B:
Assumption 2. For every α∗1 ∈ A
∗
1 and θ ∈ Θ, BR2(θ, α
∗
1|u2) is a singleton.
Assumption 2 requires player 2 to have a strict best reply against any commitment action in any state of the
world. Since Θ and Γ are finite, A∗1 is also finite. Therefore, Assumption 2 is satisfied for generic u2.
Remark: Allowing the committed long-run player to play mixed actions is not only a robustness exercise,
but also captures a number of economically relevant scenarios. Under the interpretation that the committed
long-run player is ethical, his behavior may depend on variables other than θ, for example, an ethical firm
also cares about its workers’ well-being, and commits to provide on-time deliveries unless its workers are sick.
When this additional random variable is i.i.d. over time and is the ethical firm’s private information, the ethical
firm behaves as if it is mixing between different actions. Under an alternative interpretation that the committed
long-run player is naive, he may fail to play his intended action due to mistakes or trembles. From the short-run
players’ perspective, the committed long-run player mixes between several of his pure actions.
3 Characterization Theorem
I evaluate the robustness of private-value reputation results in interdependent value environments. My main
result characterizes sufficient and (almost) necessary conditions under which a patient player 1 can secure
his commitment payoff regardless of his stage-game payoff function. My analysis highlights the distinctions
between private and interdependent value models when the committed long-run player can play mixed actions,
both in terms of his guaranteed payoff and his behavior that secures his commitment payoff.
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3.1 Commitment Payoff & Lowest Equilibrium Payoff
For given (θ, α∗1) ∈ Θ ×A
∗
1, player 1’s (complete information) commitment payoff from playing α
∗
1 in state θ
is:
vθ(α
∗
1, u1, u2) ≡ min
a2∈BR2(θ,α∗1|u2)
u1(θ, α
∗
1, a2). (3.1)
For a given parameter configuration (δ, µ, u1, u2), let NE(δ, µ, u1, u2) ⊂ Σ be the set of Bayes Nash equilibria
(or BNE), which is non-empty according to the arguments in Fudenberg and Levine (1983). Let
vθ(δ, µ, u1, u2) ≡ inf
σ∈NE(δ,µ,u1,u2)
E(σθ ,σ2)
[ +∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(θ, a1,t, a2,t)
]
(3.2)
be player 1’s lowest equilibrium payoff in state θ.4 The question is: for given (θ, α∗1) ∈ Θ×A
∗
1, when is
lim inf
δ→1
vθ(δ, µ, u1, u2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
player 1’s lowest equilibrium payoff in state θ
≥ vθ(α
∗
1, u1, u2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
player 1’s commitment payoff from α∗1 in state θ
for all u1? (3.3)
In private value environments where u2 does not depend on the state, or more generally, player 2’s best
reply against α∗1 does not depend on the state, inequality (3.3) is implied by the results in Fudenberg and Levine
(1989, 1992) and player 1 can guarantee his commitment payoff by playing α∗1 in every period. Intuitively, after
observing player 1’s action frequency matches α∗1 for a long time, player 2s will be convinced that player 1’s
action is close to α∗1 in all future periods, and will play a myopic best reply against α
∗
1. As a result, a patient
player 1 can secure his commitment payoff in all except for a bounded number of periods.
This result captures the logic behind reputation building that once people observe a player’s behavior fol-
lowing a particular pattern for a long time (e.g., a seller provides good service 90% of the time), they tend to
believe that his future behaviors will be similar. This reputation result is robust in the sense that it does not
depend on the selection of equilibrium, player 1’s payoff function, or player 2s’ beliefs about player 1’s payoff
function.5 These properties are important for economic applications: Despite researchers are likely to obtain
precise information about consumers’ (i.e., player 2s) willingness to pay through surveys, it is hard for them to
correctly specify the firm’s (player 1) objective function due to its confidentiality and its complicated nature.
The above intuition no longer applies when player 2’s best reply against α∗1 depends on the state, since
4Strategic player 1’s payoff in this repeated incomplete information game is a |Θ|-dimensional vector, in which every entry of this
vector stands for player 1’s discounted average payoff in a given state.
5Fudenberg and Levine (1989,1992)’s results are also robust against the presence of other commitment types, including those that
play non-stationary strategies. However, since the short-run players can learn about the long-run player’s type only through the latter’s
actions, this robust property cannot be achieved in my model as long as interdependent values are nontrivial. This is the case even when
we allow the committed long-run player to play non-stationary strategies. This is explained in Section 6.
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convincing player 2s that α∗1 will be played does not determine her best reply. In particular, playing α
∗
1 in every
period may signal states other than θ under which player 2’s best reply is different.
3.2 Statement of Result
I introduce three sets of beliefs. Player 2s’ prior belief belonging to the second and third sets are sufficient and
(almost) necessary conditions for a patient player 1 to guarantee his commitment payoffs from pure actions and
nontrivially mixed actions, respectively.
Recall from (2.2) that µ is player 2s’ prior belief. For every θ ∈ Θ, I say that player 1 is strategic type θ if
he is strategic and knows that the state is θ. Abusing notation, let µ(θ) be the prior probability of strategic type
θ. For every α∗1 ∈ A
∗
1, I say that player 1 is commitment type α
∗
1 if he is committed and plays α
∗
1 in every period.
Let µ(α∗1) be the prior probability of commitment type α
∗
1. For every θ ∈ Θ, let λθ(µ, α
∗
1) ≡ µ(θ)/µ(α
∗
1) and
let λ(µ, α∗1) ≡
{
λθ(µ, α
∗
1)
}
θ∈Θ
∈ Rm+ be the prior likelihood ratio vector with respect to α
∗
1, where m ≡ |Θ|.
Let φα∗1 ∈ ∆(Θ) be the state distribution conditional on player 1 being commitment type α
∗
1. Since µ has full
support, both λ(µ, α∗1) and φα∗1 are well-defined and can be computed from µ. To avoid confusion, I use θ to
denote a generic state and θ∗ to denote the chosen state in my subsequent analysis.
Best Response Set: For every (θ∗, α∗1) ∈ Θ×A
∗
1, let a
∗
2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2) be the unique element in BR2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2),
which is well-defined under Assumption 2. Let Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) be the set of λ ≡ {λθ}θ∈Θ ∈ R
m
+ such that:
{
a∗2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2)
}
= arg max
a2∈A2
{
u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λθu2(θ, α
∗
1, a2)
}
. (3.4)
According to (3.4), whether the prior likelihood ratio vector λ(µ, α∗1) belongs to Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) depends only on
whether a∗2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2) best replies against α
∗
1 conditional on the union of the following two events:
• player 1 is committed and plays α∗1 in every period,
• player 1 is strategic.
Commitment types playing actions other than α∗1 are ignored since their probabilities vanish to zero in the long
run given that player 1’s action frequency is approximately α∗1 (which happens with probability close to 1 when
player 1 plays α∗1 in every period), i.e., those types have negligible impact on a patient player 1’s payoff.
However, the prior likelihood ratio vector belonging to Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) is insufficient for player 1 to secure
a high payoff in the repeated game since player 2s’ beliefs are updated over time. As a result, player 1 needs
to find a strategy under which player 2s have incentives to play the desirable best reply under their posterior
8
λθ1
λθ2
Λ
λθ1
λθ2
Λ
λθ1
Λ
belief after observing a′1
belief after observing a′′1
λ(µ, α∗1)
Figure 1: Games with 2 bad states, with Λ in the left panel, Λ in the middle panel, and Λ in the right panel.
beliefs about the state. Whether α∗1 is pure or mixed affects the attainability of commitment payoff since it
determines the set of posterior beliefs that can arise from a given prior belief.
Securing Pure Commitment Payoffs: When α∗1 is pure, each entry of the likelihood ratio vector is nonin-
creasing over time as long as player 1 plays α∗1 in every period. Let
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) ≡
{
λ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣λ′ ∈ Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) for all 0 ≤ λ′ ≤ λ}. (3.5)
According to (3.5), whether λ(µ, α∗1) belongs to Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) depends only on the following two events:
• player 1 is committed and plays α∗1 in every period,
• player 1 is strategic and knows that player 2’s best reply against α∗1 is not a
∗
2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2).
Intuitively, in the worst-case scenario, strategic types who know that a∗2(θ
∗, α∗1|u2) best replies against α
∗
1
separate from commitment type α∗1 while the other strategic types (which I call bad strategic types) pool with
commitment type α∗1 with positive probability. The left and middle panels of Figure 1 explain the differences
between Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) and Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2), as well as how to obtain Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) from Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2).
Securing Mixed Commitment Payoffs: When α∗1 is nontrivially mixed, λ ∈ Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) is no long suf-
ficient since playing some actions in the support of α∗1 may increase some (or all) entries of the likelihood
ratio vector. This can happen when player 2s believe that some bad strategic types play a1 ∈ supp(α
∗
1) with
probability strictly greater than α∗1(a1). This is explained via the following example:
• Suppose α∗1 =
1
2a
′
1 +
1
2a
′′
1 , there are two states θ1 and θ2 under which player 2’s best reply against α
∗
1
differs from that under state θ∗. The prior likelihood ratio vector λ is depicted in the right panel of Figure
9
1 (see red dot), which belongs to Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2). Suppose player 2 believes that strategic type θ1 plays
a′1 with probability 1 and strategic type θ2 plays a
′′
1 with probability 1. No matter which action player
1 plays in the support of α∗1, the posterior likelihood ratio vector is bounded away from Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2).
These posteriors are depicted as the blue arrows in the right panel of Figure 1.
The aforementioned problem disappears when the prior likelihood ratio vector belongs to:
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) ≡ R
m
+
∖
co
(
Rm+
∖
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
, (3.6)
where co(·) denotes the convex hull. Intuitively, the likelihood ratio vector is a non-negative supermartingale
conditional on α∗1, and (3.6) implies that R
m\Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) is a convex set. As a result, there exists at least
one pure action a1 in the support of α
∗
1 such that the posterior likelihood ratio vector belongs to Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2)
after observing a1. The middle and right panels of Figure 1 explain the differences between Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) and
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2), as well as how to obtain Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) from Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2).
Statement of Result: Let cl(·) be the closure of a set. My characterization result is stated as Theorem 1:
Theorem 1. For every (θ∗, α∗1) ∈ Θ×A
∗
1 with α
∗
1 being a pure action,
1. If λ(µ, α∗1) ∈ Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2), then lim infδ→1 vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) ≥ vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2) for every u1.
2. If λ(µ, α∗1) /∈ cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
and BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) is a singleton, then there exists u1 such that
lim supδ→1 vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) < vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2).
For every (θ∗, α∗1) ∈ Θ×A
∗
1 with α
∗
1 being a nontrivially mixed action,
3. If λ(µ, α∗1) ∈ Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2), then lim infδ→1 vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) ≥ vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2) for every u1.
4. If λ(µ, α∗1) /∈ cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
, BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) is a singleton and α
∗
1 /∈ co
(
A∗1
∖
{α∗1}
)
, then there
exists u1 such that lim supδ→1 vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) < vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2).
The proof is in Section 4 (Statements 1 and 3), Section 5 (Statement 2), Appendix A (Statement 3), and
Online Appendix A (Statement 4). The main technical contribution is the proof of a learning result (Proposition
2), which is the key step to show Statement 3 and is also potable to study games with imperfect monitoring.
In what follows, I discuss the economic implications of Theorem 1 (Section 3.3), and comment on the ad-
ditional technical conditions in Statements 2 and 4 of Theorem 1 (Section 3.4). To avoid cumbersome notation,
I replace α∗1 with a
∗
1 when it is pure, and suppress the dependence of a
∗
2, λ, Λ, and Λ on α
∗
1, θ
∗, and u2 in my
subsequent analysis.
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3.3 Implications of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 has different implications under different interpretations of the interdependent value reputation
game. In particular, whether strategic types other than θ∗ are treated as perturbations that occur with arbitrarily
low probability, such as in Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988) and other papers on robustness; or those
strategic types are descriptions of the payoff environment as in Aumann and Maschler (1995) and other models
of repeated incomplete information games, in which case they occur with probability bounded away from 0.
First, Theorem 1 points out the failure of reputation effects in repeated incomplete information games with
nontrivial interdependent values. According to this interpretation, the interdependent value reputation model is
obtained by perturbing a repeated incomplete information game with a small probability of commitment types,
i.e., every commitment type is arbitrarily unlikely relative to every strategic type. When player 2’s best reply
against α∗1 depends on the state, i.e., there exist θ
′, θ′′ ∈ Θ such that:
BR2(θ
′, α∗1|u2)
⋂
BR2(θ
′′, α∗1|u2) = {∅}, (3.7)
and the total probability of commitment types is below some cutoff, the prior likelihood ratio vector λ(µ, α∗1)
does not belong to the closures of Λ(θ, α∗1, u2) and Λ(θ, α
∗
1, u2) for any θ ∈ Θ. According to Statements 2
and 4 of Theorem 1, there exists u1 and an equilibrium under which player 1’s equilibrium payoff is strictly
bounded below his commitment payoff from α∗1 no matter how patient he is.
Second, Theorem 1 evaluates the robustness of reputation effects in private value reputation games against
interdependent value perturbations. Under this interpretation, a private value reputation game in Fudenberg
and Levine (1989, 1992) is perturbed with a small probability of other strategic types. These interdependent
value perturbations are widely considered in the robustness literature, which include Fudenberg, Kreps and
Levine (1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990). They capture the possibility that the short-run players do not
know their own payoffs, such as buyers facing uncertainty about the safety or durability of the seller’s products,
which the seller knows more about. My sufficient and (almost) necessary conditions in Statements 1 and 3 of
Theorem 1 are satisfied when the short-run players’ doubt on their own payoffs is sufficiently small.
The comparison between Λ and Λ unveils the differences between attaining commitment payoffs from pure
actions and nontrivially mixed actions. When Λ is a strict subset of Λ, small trembles to a pure commitment
action can lead to a discontinuous change in a patient player 1’s lowest equilibrium payoff. To formalize this, fix
Θ,A1, and A2. A type space is denoted byM≡
{
A∗1, µ, (φα∗1)α∗1∈A∗1
}
, which consists of a set of commitment
actions, a distribution over types (both strategic and committed), and the state distribution conditional on each
commitment type. I introduce the notion of mixed-ǫ-elaboration:
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Definition 1. For any given ǫ > 0,Mǫ ≡
{
Aǫ1, µ
ǫ, (φǫα∗1
)α∗1∈Aǫ1
}
is a mixed-ǫ-elaboration ofM if:
1. For every α′1 ∈ A
ǫ
1 and a1 ∈ A1, α
′
1(a1) < 1.
2. For every θ ∈ Θ,
∥∥µ(θ)− µǫ(θ)∥∥ < ǫ.
3. For every α1 ∈ A
∗
1, there exists α
′
1 ∈ A
ǫ
1 such that:
∥∥α′1 − α1∥∥ < ǫ, ∣∣µ(α1)− µǫ(α′1)∣∣ < ǫ and ∥∥φα1 − φǫα′1∥∥ < ǫ.
Intuitively, Mǫ is close to M in terms of the probability of each strategic type, and moreover, for each
commitment action in A∗1, there exists a commitment action in A
ǫ
1 that is ǫ-close in terms of the distribution
over pure actions, the state distribution conditional on this commitment type, and the probability with which it
occurs. In addition, there is no pure commitment action in the perturbed type space Aǫ1.
When players’ stage-game payoffs are u1 and u2, let vθ(δ, µ, u1, u2) be type θ’s lowest equilibrium payoff
inM, and let vθ(δ, µ
ǫ, u1, u2) be his lowest equilibrium payoff inM
ǫ. Let int(·) denote the interior of a set.
Theorem 2. For every θ∗ ∈ Θ and pure commitment action a∗1 ∈ A
∗
1. When the prior belief µ is such that:
λ(µ, a∗1) ∈ int
(
Λ(θ∗, a∗1, u2)
∖
Λ(θ∗, a∗1, u2)
)
, (3.8)
there exist u1, ǫ > 0, and τ > 0 such that for every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ) and every mixed ǫ-elaborationM
ǫ ofM:
lim inf
δ→1
vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) > τ + lim sup
δ→1
vθ∗(δ, µ
ǫ, u1, u2). (3.9)
Theorem 2 shows that under an open set of beliefs, small perturbations to a pure commitment action can
lead to a substantial decrease in player 1’s lowest equilibrium payoff. This stands in contrast to Fudenberg and
Levine (1989, 1992)’s private value reputation models, in which there is no discontinuity between pure and
mixed commitments when player 2 has a strict best reply against each of player 1’s pure actions.
In order to apply Theorem 2, my next result characterizes, for given (θ∗, α∗1) ∈ Θ × A
∗
1, necessary and
sufficient conditions under which Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
∖
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) has non-empty interior. Recall that a
∗
2 is the
short-hand notation for player 2’s best reply against α∗1 in state θ
∗. Let
Θb(α∗1,θ∗)
≡
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣a∗2 /∈ BR2(θ, α∗1|u2)} (3.10)
be the set of states under which player 2’s best reply against α∗1 differs from that under state θ
∗. For every
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θ ∈ Θb(α∗1 ,θ∗)
, let ψ∗θ be the largest ψ ∈ R+ such that:
a∗2 ∈ arg max
a2∈A2
{
u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a2) + ψu2(θ, α
∗
1, a2)
}
. (3.11)
When Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) is non-empty, or equivalently, BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) = {a
∗
2}, ψ
∗
θ is well-defined for every
θ ∈ Θb(α∗1,θ∗)
, which is the intercept of Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) on the axis for λθ. My characterization result is stated as
Proposition 1, which is shown in Online Appendix A.1:
Proposition 1. Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)\Λ(θ
∗, α∗1, u2) has nonempty interior if and only if BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) = {a
∗
2}
and there exists no a′2 6= a
∗
2 such that
u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a
∗
2) + ψ
∗
θu2(θ, α
∗
1, a
∗
2) = u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a
′
2) + ψ
∗
θu2(θ, α
∗
1, a
′
2) for every θ ∈ Θ
b
(α∗1 ,θ
∗). (3.12)
I provide an example that satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 1. Consider the
following 3× 2× 3 game:
θ∗ l m r
H 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
L 2,−1 0, 0 0, 0
θ1 l m r
H 0, 1/2 0, 3/2 0, 0
L 0, 1/2 0, 3/2 0, 0
θ2 l m r
H 0, 1/2 0, 0 0, 3/2
L 0, 1/2 0, 0 0, 3/2
Suppose A∗1 ≡ {H,L} and φH is the Dirac measure on θ
∗. Take commitment action H and state θ∗, player 2’s
best reply against H in state θ∗ is l, and moreover, BR2(φH ,H|u2) = {l}. This verifies that Λ(θ
∗,H, u2) is
non-empty. According to (3.10), Θb(H,θ∗) = {θ1, θ2}, and according to (3.11), ψ
∗
θ1
= ψ∗θ2 = 1. However,
u2(φH ,H, l) + u2(θ1,H, l) = u2(φH ,H,m) + u2(θ1,H,m) 6= u2(φH ,H, r) + u2(θ1,H, r),
u2(φH ,H, l) + u2(θ2,H, l) = u2(φH ,H, r) + u2(θ2,H, r) 6= u2(φH ,H,m) + u2(θ2,H,m).
This verifies the condition in Proposition 1, and as a result, Λ(θ∗,H, u2)\Λ(θ
∗,H, u2) has nonempty interior.
My proof of Theorem 2 implies that in this game, under an open set of prior beliefs, small perturbations to
player 1’s commitment action H can lead to a discontinuous decrease in his lowest equilibrium payoff.
3.4 Technical Remarks
I comment on the additional technical conditions in Statements 2 and 4 of Theorem 1. Readers can skip this
section and proceeds to the proof in Sections 4 and 5.
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First, my characterization result excludes the boundaries of Λ and Λ. At these knife-edge beliefs, the
attainability of commitment payoff from action α∗1 depends on the presence of other mixed commitment types
as well as the state distribution conditional on those commitment types.
Second, under Assumption 1, the requirement that BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) being a singleton is satisfied under
generic values of (µ, u2), and is required only when Λ = {∅}. This condition rules out pathological knife-edge
cases in which a∗2 ∈ BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2) but {a
∗
2} 6= BR2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1|u2). For example, when Θ = {θ, θ
′}, A1 =
{a∗1, a
′
1},A2 = {a
∗
2, a
′
2} andA
∗
1 = {a
∗
1, (1−ǫ)a
∗
1+ǫa
′
1}with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), φa∗1(θ
′) = 1, and φ(1−ǫ)a∗1+ǫa′1(θ) = 1.
Suppose {a∗2} = BR2(θ, a
∗
1|u2) = BR2(θ, a
′
1|u2) and {a
∗
2, a
′
2} = BR2(θ
′, a∗1|u2) = BR2(θ
′, a′1|u2), type θ can
guarantee payoff u1(θ, a
∗
1, a
∗
2) by playing a
∗
1 in every period despite Λ is empty. This is because a
∗
2 is player
2’s strict best reply against commitment type (1− ǫ)a∗1 + ǫa
′
1.
Third, according to the separating hyperplane theorem, the requirement that α∗1 /∈ co
(
A∗1\{α
∗
1}
)
guar-
antees the existence of a stage-game payoff function u1(θ
∗, ·, ·) under which strategic type θ∗’s commitment
payoff from any commitment action in A∗1\{α
∗
1} is strictly less than his commitment payoff from α
∗
1. This
convex independence condition cannot be dispensed since no restrictions are made on the probabilities of other
commitment types. That is to say, commitment types other than α∗1 are allowed to occur with arbitrarily high
probability and can have arbitrary correlation with the payoff-relevant state. According to Statement 3 of The-
orem 1, type θ∗ can guarantee his commitment payoff from commitment actions other than α∗1.
4 Proof of Statements 1 and 3
The proof of Statement 1 (Section 4.1) resembles that of Theorem 1’ in Pei (2020), in which the patient player
can secure his commitment payoff by playing a∗1 in every period. The substantial difference arises when α
∗
1 is
nontrivially mixed (Section 4.2), since playing some actions in the support of α∗1 can increase the likelihood
ratio vector in certain dimensions. As a result, player 1 cannot secure his commitment payoff by playing α∗1 in
every period. It also suggests the need for player 1 to cherry-pick actions in the support of α∗1.
The key step to construct such a cherry-picking process is the following learning result (Proposition 2), that
when the prior likelihood ratio vector λ belongs to Λ, for each equilibrium strategy profile σ, player 1 has a
deviation under which the following three objectives are achieved simultaneously: (1) The posterior likelihood
ratio vector remains in Λ for all periods; (2) Every a1 ∈ A1 is played with discounted average frequency close
to α∗1(a1); (3) In expectation, player 2s believe that actions within a small neighborhood of α
∗
1 will be played
for all except for a bounded number of periods. There is a remaining step that deals with potential correlations
between the actions and the state, which is in Appendix A.2 with ideas summarized by the end of Section 4.2.
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Throughout the proofs in this section, I ignore commitment types other than α∗1. This is without loss of
generality for my argument: when player 1 deviates to a strategy in which the discounted average frequency of
his action is approximately α∗1, the posterior probabilities of those commitment types vanish to 0 exponentially.
As a result, those types have negligible impact on a patient player 1’s discounted average payoff.
4.1 Proof of Statement 1
Let h
t
be a public history in which a∗1 was played in all previous periods. For every θ ∈ Θ, let qt(θ) be the ex
ante probability of the event that ht = h
t
and player 1 is strategic type θ. Player 2’s problem at h
t
is:
max
a2∈A2
{
µ(a∗1)u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
[
qt+1(θ)u2(θ, a
∗
1, a2) + (qt(θ)− qt+1(θ))u2(θ, α1,t(θ), a2)
]}
(4.1)
in which α1,t(θ) ∈ ∆(A1\{a
∗
1}) can be arbitrary if type θ plays a
∗
1 with probability 1 at h
t
(in which case
qt(θ) = qt+1(θ)), and is the distribution of type θ’s action at h
t
conditional on a1,t 6= a
∗
1 if type θ does not play
a∗1 with probability 1 at h
t
. According to (4.1) and the definition of Λ in (3.5), there exists ρ > 0 such that
player 2 has a strict incentive to play a∗2 at h
t
as long as:
∑
θ∈Θ
qt+1(θ) >
∑
θ∈Θ
qt(θ)− ρ. (4.2)
If player 1 plays a∗1 in every period, then there exist at most T ≡
⌈
1/ρ
⌉
periods in which player 2 does not have
a strict incentive to play a∗2. Therefore, type θ
∗’s equilibrium payoff is at least:
(1− δT ) min
(a1,a2)∈A1×A2
u1(θ
∗, a1, a2) + δ
T vθ∗(a
∗
1, u1, u2). (4.3)
Since T is independent of δ, the value of (4.3) converges to vθ∗(a
∗
1, u1, u2) as δ → 1.
4.2 Proof of Statement 3: A Learning Result
I state and show a learning result (Proposition 2) that is interesting for its own sake. For every ψ ≡ (ψ1, ...ψm) ∈
Rm+ and χ > 0, let
Λ(ψ,χ) ≡
{
(λ˜1, λ˜2, ..., λ˜m) ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
λ˜i
ψi
< χ
}
. (4.4)
Let µ(ht) be player 2’s posterior belief at ht. I write λ(ht) in short for λ(µ(ht), α∗1), which is the likelihood
ratio vector with respect to commitment action α∗1 at h
t. Let h∞ be an infinite history and let h∞t be player 1’s
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action in period t according to h∞. Let A1 ≡ supp(α
∗
1). For every σθ : H → ∆(A1) and σ2 : H → ∆(A2), let
P(σθ ,σ2) be the probability measure over H induced by (σθ, σ2), let H
(σθ ,σ2) be the set of histories that occur
with positive probability under P(σθ ,σ2), and let E(σθ,σ2) be its expectation operator.
Proposition 2. If λ ∈ Λ(ψ,χ), then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for every δ > δ, every Bayes Nash
equilibrium σ, and every ǫ > 0, there exist T ∈ N and σ̂θ : H → ∆(A1), such that:
λ(ht) ∈ Λ(ψ,χ+ ǫ) for every ht ∈ H(σ̂θ,σ2), (4.5)
∣∣∣ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{h∞t = a1} − α
∗
1(a1)
∣∣∣ < ǫ
2(2χ + ǫ)
for every h∞ ∈ H(σ̂θ,σ2) and a1 ∈ A1, (4.6)
E(σ̂θ,σ2)
[
#
{
t ∈ N
∣∣∣||α∗1 − α1(·|ht)|| > ǫ}] < T. (4.7)
Proposition 2 implies the following corollary, which is the key step to show Statement 3 of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. If λ ∈ Λ and δ is large, then for every equilibrium σ, there exists σ̂θ : H → ∆(A1), s.t.
1. Player 2’s posterior likelihood ratio vector in every period belongs to Λ with probability 1.
2. The discounted average frequency of every a1 ∈ A1 is approximately α
∗
1(a1).
3. Player 2’s prediction about player 1’s action is close to α∗1 in all but a bounded number of periods.
Proposition 2 implies Corollary 1 due to the following characterization of Λ shown in Appendix A.1:
Lemma 4.1. If Λ 6= {∅} and player 2’s stage-game payoff function satisfies Assumption 2,6 then:
Λ =
{
(λθ)θ∈Θ ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣ ∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗
1
,θ∗)
λθ
ψ∗θ
< 1
}
. (4.8)
Let ψθ ≡ ψ
∗
θ for every θ ∈ Θ
b
(α∗1,θ
∗). The assumption that λ ∈ Λ and the characterization of Λ in Lemma
4.1 imply that
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗
1
,θ∗)
λθ/ψ
∗
θ < 1. For every θ /∈ Θ
b
(α∗1,θ
∗), let ψθ ∈ R+ be large enough such that∑m
i=1
λi
ψi
< 1. By construction, λ ∈ Λ(ψ, 1), and Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 2.
In what follows, I show Proposition 2 in three steps. The proof of Statement 3 after establishing Proposition
2 is relegated to Appendix A.2.
6When Assumption 2 is violated, I show in Online Appendix B that for every λ ∈ Λ, there exists ψ ∈ Rm+ such that λ ∈{
(λ˜1, λ˜2, ..., λ˜m) ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣∑mi=1 λ˜iψi < 1
}
⊂ Λ. One can then apply Proposition 2 to
{
(λ˜1, λ˜2, ..., λ˜m) ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣∑mi=1 λ˜iψi < 1
}
.
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Step 1: Let P(α
∗
1 ,σ2) be the probability measure over H when player 1 plays α∗1 in every period and player
2 plays according to σ2. Let χ(h
t) ≡
∑m
i=1 λi(h
t)/ψi. By definition, λ ∈ Λ(ψ,χ) if and only if χ(h
0) < χ.
Let {F t}t∈N be the filtration induced by the public history. Since {λi(h
t),P(α
∗
1 ,σ2),F t}t∈N is a non-negative
supermartingale for every i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, {χt,P
(α∗1 ,σ2),F t}t∈N is also a non-negative supermartingale. For
every a < b, let U(a, b) be the number of upcrossings from a to b. The Doob’s Upcrossing Inequality implies:
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)
{
U(χ, χ+
ǫ
2
) ≥ 1
}
≤
2χ
2χ+ ǫ
. (4.9)
Let H˜∞ be the set of infinite histories such that χt ≤ χ+
ǫ
2 for every t ∈ N. According to (4.9), it occurs with
probability at least ǫ2χ+ǫ under probability measure P
(α∗1 ,σ2).
Step 2: I show that when δ is close enough to 1, there exists a subset ofH∞ that occurs with probability close
to 1 under probability measure P(α
∗
1 ,σ2), such that the occupation measure of every a1 ∈ A1 is close to α
∗
1(a1).
For any a1 ∈ A1, let {Xt} be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables such that:
Xt =
 1 when a1,t = a10 otherwise .
Under probability measure P(α
∗
1 ,σ2), Xt = 1 occurs with probability α
∗
1(a1). Therefore, the mean of Xt is
α∗1(a1) and the variance is σ
2 ≡ α∗1(a1)(1 − α
∗
1(a1)). Let n ≡ |A1|. The following lemma is implied by the
Lindeberg-Feller Central Limit Theorem for triangular sequences (Chung 1974):
Lemma 4.2. For every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1),
lim sup
δ→1
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)
(∣∣∣ +∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtXt − α
∗
1(a1)
∣∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ ε
n
. (4.10)
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2: For every n ∈ N, let X̂n ≡ δ
n(Xn−α
∗
1(a1)). Define a triangular sequence of random
variables {Xk,n}0≤n≤k,k,n∈N, such that Xk,n ≡ ξkX̂n, where
ξk ≡
√
1
σ2
1− δ2
1− δ2k
.
Let Zk ≡
∑k
n=1Xk,n = ξk
∑n
k=1 X̂n. According to the Lindeberg-Feller Central Limit Theorem, Zk con-
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verges in law to N(0, 1). By construction,
∑k
n=1 X̂n
1 + δ + ...+ δk−1
= σ
√
1− δ2k
1− δ2
1− δ
1− δk
Zk.
The RHS of this expression converges (in distribution) to a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ2
1− δ2k
1− δ2
(1− δ)2
(1− δk)2
.
The variance term converges to O
(
(1 − δ)
)
as k → ∞. According to Theorem 7.4.1 in Chung (1974), we
have:
sup
x∈R
|Fk(x)−Φ(x)| ≤ C0
k∑
n=1
|Xk,n|
3 ∼ C1(1− δ)
3
2 ,
where C0 and C1 are constants, Fk is the empirical distribution of Zk and Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal
distribution. Both the variance and the approximation error converge to 0 as δ → 1.
Therefore, for every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ > δ, there exists K ∈ N, such that
for all k > K,
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)
(∣∣∣ ∑ki=1 X̂n
1 + δ + ...+ δk−1
∣∣∣ ≥ ε) < ε
n
.
The conclusion of Lemma 4.2 is obtained by taking k →∞.
Step 3: According to Lemma 4.2, for every a1 ∈ A1 and ǫ > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that for all δ > δ,
there exists H∞ǫ,a1(δ) ⊂ H
∞, such that:
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)(H∞ε,a1(δ)) ≥ 1− ε/n, (4.11)
and for every h∞ ∈ H∞ε,a1(δ), the discounted average frequency of a1 is ε-close to α
∗
1(a1). Let H
∞
ε (δ) ≡⋂
a1∈A1
H∞ε,a1(δ). According to (4.11):
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)(H∞ε (δ)) ≥ 1− ε. (4.12)
Take ε ≡ ǫ2(2χ+ǫ) and let
Ĥ∞ ≡ H˜∞
⋂
H∞ε (δ), (4.13)
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we have:
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)(Ĥ∞) ≥
ǫ
2(2χ+ ǫ)
(4.14)
Let d(·‖·) denote the KL-divergence between two distributions. Gossner (2011)’s result implies that:
E(α
∗
1,σ2)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(α∗1||α1(·|h
τ ))
]
≤ − log µ(α∗1). (4.15)
Since the KL-divergence is non-negative, the Markov Inequality implies that:
E(α
∗
1,σ2)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(α∗||α(·|hτ ))
∣∣∣Ĥ∞] ≤ −2(2χ + ǫ) log µ(α∗1)
ǫ
. (4.16)
Let P∗ be the probability measure over H∞ such that for every H∞0 ⊂ H
∞,
P∗(H∞0 ) ≡
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)(H∞0
⋂
Ĥ∞)
P(α
∗
1 ,σ2)(Ĥ∞)
.
Let σ̂θ : H → ∆(A1) be the mapping that induces probability measure P
∗. Since
E(σ̂θ ,σ2)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(α∗||α(·|hτ ))
]
= E(α
∗
1,σ2)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(α∗||α(·|hτ ))
∣∣∣Ĥ∞] ≤ −2(2χ + ǫ) log µ(α∗1)
ǫ
,
the expected number of periods in which d(α∗1||α(·|h
t)) > ǫ2/2 is at most:
T ≡
⌈
−
4(2χ+ ǫ) log µ(α∗1)
ǫ3
⌉
. (4.17)
The Pinsker’s inequality implies that the expected number of periods in which ||α∗1 − α(·|h
t)|| > ǫ is at most
T . The three steps together imply Proposition 2.
Summary of Remaining Steps: Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 do not directly imply that type θ∗ can guar-
antee payoff vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2) for every u1. This is because due to the potential correlation between player 1’s
action and the state, player 2s may not have incentives to play a∗2 despite λ ∈ Λ and player 1’s average action
is close to α∗1. I address this issue in Appendix A, with the main ideas summarized below. Suppose λ ∈ Λ,
1. Suppose all entries of λ except for at most one is sufficiently small, then player 2 has a strict incentive to
play a∗2 when player 1’s average action is close to α
∗
1. Let Λ
0 be the set of beliefs with this feature. By
construction, one can directly apply Proposition 2 to establish inequality (3.3).
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2. If player 1’s average action is close to α∗1 but player 2 does not have a strict incentive to play a
∗
2, then
different types of player 1’s actions at that history must be significantly different. This implies that player
1’s action at that history must be informative about his type, in which case he can pick a particular action
that induces player 2 to learn. I show that for every λ ∈ Λ, there exists a finite integer K(λ) and a
strategy for type θ∗ such that if type θ∗ follows this strategy, then after at mostK(λ) such periods, player
2’s belief about his type belongs to Λ0, which concludes the proof.
5 Proof of Statement 2
Pei (2020) focuses on a simple case in which all actions in A∗1 are pure. When player 1’s stage-game payoff
function is u1(θ, a1, a2) ≡ 1{θ = θ
∗, a1 = a
∗
1, a2 = a
∗
2}, he constructs a low-payoff equilibrium in which
all strategic types in Θb(a∗1,θ∗)
, defined in (3.10), play a∗1 in every period, and the other strategic types play a
∗
1
in every period. This equilibrium strategy introduces a tradeoff between establishing a reputation for playing
a∗1, and signaling that the state is θ
∗. When facing this tradeoff, type θ∗ has an incentive to separate from
commitment type a∗1, which makes player 2s’ beliefs about his actions self-fulfilling.
Such a construction does not work when there are commitment types playing nontrivially mixed strategies.
To illustrate, consider an example in which Θ = {θ, θ˜}, θ˜ ∈ Θb(a∗1 ,θ)
, A∗1 = {a
∗
1, α
′
1}, α
′
1 is non-trivially mixed,
attaching positive probability to a∗1, with {a
∗
2} = BR2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1|u2) = BR2(φα′1 , α
′
1|u2). If type θ˜ plays a
∗
1 in
every period, then type θ can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to 1 by playing a1 ∈ supp(α
′
1)\{a
∗
1} in period 0
and a∗1 in every subsequent period. The reason is: after observing a1 in period 0, player 2s attach probability 1
to commitment type α′1 and have a strict incentive to play a
∗
2.
To overcome this challenge, I construct a sequential equilibrium in which the bad strategic types play non-
stationary strategies. In the example, type θ˜ plays a∗1 in every period with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and plays
non-stationary strategy σ(α′1) with probability 1− p, with p being large enough such that λ1 is bounded away
from Λ after a∗1 is played in period 0. Strategy σ(α
′
1) is described as follows:
• Play α′1 at histories that are consistent with type θ’s equilibrium strategy.
• Otherwise, play a completely mixed action α̂′1 that attaches higher probability to a
∗
1 compared to α
′
1.
To verify incentive compatibility, I keep track of the likelihood ratio between strategic type θ˜ who plays
σ(α′1) and the commitment type α1. If type θ has never deviated before, then this ratio remains constant. If
type θ has deviated before, then this ratio increases every time a∗1 is observed. Therefore, once type θ has
deviated from his equilibrium play, he constantly faces a trade-off between obtaining a high stage-game payoff
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(by playing a∗1) and reducing the likelihood ratio. This leads to a uniform upper bound on his continuation
value after any deviation. Type θ’s on-path strategy is then constructed so that his continuation value is strictly
between his commitment payoff and his highest post-deviation continuation payoff.
5.1 Equilibrium Construction
My constructive proof of Statement 2 consists of three steps:
Step 1: I show that when λ /∈ cl(Λ), there exist a2 6= a
∗
2 and λ
′ ≡ {λ′θ}θ∈Θ, such that first, 0 ≤ λ
′ ≤ λ and
λ′θ∗ = 0, second, ∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θ
(
u2(θ, a
∗
1, a2)− u2(θ, a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
)
> 0, (5.1)
and third,
u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a2)− u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
∗
2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θ
(
u2(θ, a
∗
1, a2)− u2(θ, a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
)
> 0. (5.2)
According to the definition of Λ in (3.5), there exists λ′′ ≡ {λ′′θ}θ∈Θ such that 0 ≤ λ
′′ ≤ λ, and
a∗2 /∈ arg max
a2∈A2
{
u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
′
2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′′θu2(θ, a
∗
1, a
′
2)
}
.
Let λ′ ∈ Rm+ be such that λ
′
θ∗ ≡ 0, and λ
′
θ ≡ λ
′′
θ for all θ 6= θ
∗. Since {a∗2} = BR2(θ
∗, a∗1|u2), there exists
a′2 6= a
∗
2:
u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
′
2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, a
∗
1, a
′
2) > u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
∗
2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, a
∗
1, a
∗
2).
If the unique element in BR2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1|u2) is a
∗
2, then (5.1) and (5.2) hold for a2 = a
′
2. If the unique element in
BR2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1|u2) is a
′′
2 6= a
∗
2, then there exists θ
′ ∈ Θ such that u2(θ
′, a∗1, a
′′
2) > u2(θ
′, a∗1, a
∗
2). Let λ
′ ∈ Rm+ be
defined as: λ′θ′ ≡ λθ′ , and λ
′
θ ≡ 0 for all θ 6= θ
′, then (5.1) and (5.2) hold for λ′ and a2 = a
′′
2 .
Step 2: Let
u1(θ, a1, a2) ≡ 1{θ = θ
∗, a1 = a
∗
1, a2 = a
∗
2}. (5.3)
By definition, vθ∗(a
∗
1, u1, u2) = 1. I describe players’ equilibrium strategies. On the equilibrium path, strategic
type θ∗ plays a different pure action in each period from period 0 to |A1| − 1. Starting from period |A1|, he
plays a∗1 for k
∗ ∈ N periods and then some prespecified a1 6= a
∗
1 in the k
∗ + 1th period. His on-path behavior
rotates every k∗ + 1 periods. I will specify the value of integer k∗ by the end of step 3.
I construct λ′ ∈ Rm+ and a
′
2 6= a
∗
2 according to Step 1. Inequality (5.2) implies the existence of ǫ > 0 such
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that:
u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
′
2)− u2(φa∗1 , a
∗
1, a
∗
2) + (1− ǫ)
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θ
(
u2(θ, a
∗
1, a
′
2)− u2(θ, a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
)
> 0. (5.4)
For every θ˜ 6= θ∗, with probability
(
λ
θ˜
− λ′
θ˜
)/
λ
θ˜
, strategic type θ˜ plays a′1 6= a
∗
1 in every period; with
probability (1−ǫ)λ′
θ˜
/λ
θ˜
, strategic type θ˜ plays a∗1 in every period. For every α1 ∈ A
∗
1 that is nontrivially mixed,
strategic type θ˜ plays strategy σα1 with probability
ǫ
kλ
′
θ˜
/
λ
θ˜
, with k ∈ N being the number of nontrivially mixed
commitment actions in A∗1 and σα1 will be specified in the next paragraph. If k = 0, then one can set ǫ = 0.
Next, I describe strategy σα1 . If h
t occurs with positive probability under strategic type θ∗’s equilibrium
strategy, then σα1(h
t) = α1. If h
t occurs with zero probability under strategic type θ∗’s equilibrium strategy,
then σα1(h
t) = α̂1, in which:
α̂1(α1) ≡ (1−
η
2
)a∗1 +
η
2
α˜1(α1) (5.5)
and
α˜1(α1)[a1] ≡
 0 when a1 = a∗1α1(a1)/(1 − α1(a∗1)) otherwise . (5.6)
Since A∗1 is finite, there exists η > 0 such that maxα1∈A∗1\{a∗1} α1(a
∗
1) < 1 − η. According to (5.1), for every
α′1 ∈ ∆(A1) with α
′
1(a
∗
1) ≥ 1− η, we have:
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, α
′
1, a
′
2) >
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, α
′
1, a
∗
2). (5.7)
Step 3: I verify type θ∗’s incentive constraints. Instead of explicitly constructing type θ∗’s strategy at histories
after he has deviated, I derive a uniform upper bound on his continuation payoff after his first deviation.
For every α1 ∈ A
∗
1, let µt(θ(α1)) be the probability that player 1 is strategic and follows strategy σα1 . Let
βt(α1) ≡ µt(θ(α1))/µt(α1). The value of βt(α1) equals β0(α1) at period t histories that occur with positive
probability under type θ∗’s equilibrium strategy.
Next, consider histories that occur with zero probability under type θ∗’s equilibrium strategy. Since
max
α1∈A∗1\{a
∗
1}
α1(a
∗
1) < 1− η,
then for every α1 ∈ A
∗
1\{a
∗
1},
βt+1(α1) ≥
1− η/2
1− η
βt(α1). (5.8)
when a∗1 is observed in period t. Let κ ≡ 1 −minα1∈A∗1\{a∗1} α1(a
∗
1). If a1 6= a
∗
1 is observed in period t, then
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by definition of α˜1(α1), we have:
βt+1(α1) ≥
η
2κ
βt(α1). (5.9)
Let k ≡
⌈
log 2κη
/
log 1−η/21−η
⌉
. For every α1 ∈ A
∗
1, let β(α1) be the smallest β ∈ R+ such that:
u2(φα1 , α1, a
′
2) + β
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, α̂1(α1), a
′
2) ≥ u2(φα1 , α1, a
∗
2) + β
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, α̂1(α1), a
∗
2) (5.10)
Let β ≡ 2maxα1∈A∗1\{a∗} β(α1) and β ≡ minα1∈A∗1\{a∗}
µ(θ(α1))
µ(α1)
. Let T1 ≡
⌈
log ββ
/
log 1−η/21−η
⌉
.
At any history right after type θ∗’s first deviation, βt(α1) ≥ β for all α1 ∈ A
∗
1. After player 2 observes
a∗1 for T1 consecutive periods, a
∗
2 is strictly dominated by a
′
2 until some a
′
1 6= a
∗
1 is observed. Moreover, every
time player 1 plays some a′1 6= a
∗
1, he can induce outcome (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) for at most k consecutive periods before a
∗
2
is strictly dominated by a′2 again. Therefore, type θ
∗’s continuation payoff after his first deviation is at most:
(1− δT1) + δT1
{
(1− δk−1) + δk(1− δk−1) + δ2k(1− δk−1) + ...
}
, (5.11)
which converges to k
1+k
as δ → 1. Let k∗ ≡ 2k. When δ → 1, type θ∗’s payoff at any on-path history converges
to 2k
2k+1
, which is strictly greater than (A.15).
Remark 1: At histories where player 2s have ruled out the possibility of type θ∗, the continuation play is
reminiscent of Jehiel and Samuelson (2012), in which the short-run players mistakenly believe that the strategic
long-run player uses a stationary strategy. They characterize analogical-based reasoning equilibria, in which
the strategic type alternates between his actions in order to exploit the short-run players’ misspecified beliefs.
My construction leads to similar behavior dynamics since player 2s’ beliefs at those histories attach pos-
itive probability only to types that are playing stationary strategies in the continuation game, i.e. types that
are playing α1 in every period and types that are playing α̂1(α1) in every period. Let the long-run player’s
reputation be the likelihood ratio between the commitment type α1 and the strategic types who use strategy
σ(α1). At every history in which player 2’s posterior belief attaches zero probability to type θ
∗, type θ∗ faces
a trade-off between reaping high stage-game payoff (by playing a∗1) and building his reputation (by playing
actions other than a∗1). My construction ensures that the speed of reputation building is bounded from above
while the speed of reputation deterioration is bounded from below. When player 1’s reputation is sufficiently
low, player 2 has a strict incentive to play a′2, which punishes player 1 for at least one period. This bounds the
asymptotic frequency with which player 1 can obtain high stage-game payoff.
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Remark 2: The proof of Statement 4 (i.e., constructing low-payoff equilibria when the target commitment
action is nontrivially mixed) requires several additional steps. First, the stage-game payoff function is replaced
by one that is constructed via the separating hyperplane theorem, in which type θ∗’s commitment payoff from
every other action in A∗1\{α
∗
1} is strictly lower than his commitment payoff from α
∗
1. Second, as shown in
Online Appendix A.2, there exists an integer T (independent of δ) and a T -period strategy for the strategic
types other than θ∗ such that the likelihood ratio vector in period T is bounded away from Λ regardless of
player 1’s behavior in the first T periods. Third, the continuation play after period T modifies the construction
in the proof of Statement 2. The key step is to construct the bad strategic types’ strategies under which type θ∗’s
continuation payoff after any deviation is bounded below his commitment payoff from playing α∗1. The details
are shown in Online Appendices A.4 and A.6.
6 Concluding Remarks
I discuss extensions to environments with imperfect monitoring and non-stationary commitment types.
Imperfect Monitoring: In my baseline model, player 2s can perfectly observe player 1’s pure actions. As a
result, player 1 can perfectly control player 2’s posterior belief, under which one can use the Doob’s Upcrossing
Inequality to construct a deviation under which player 2’s belief about player 1’s type belongs toΛ in all periods.
When player 2s observe a noisy signal y ∼ f(·|a1) instead of a1, one can use my proof techniques to
establish a weaker lower bound on player 1’s equilibrium payoff. Recall from (4.8) that when Λ is non-empty,
it is characterized by the following linear inequality:
Λ =
{
λ ≡ (λθ)θ∈Θ ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣ ∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗
1
,θ∗)
λθ
ψ∗θ
< 1
}
, (6.1)
where Θb(α∗1,θ∗)
is defined in (3.10). Let λt ≡ (λθ,t)θ∈Θ be the likelihood ratio vector with respect to α
∗
1 ∈ A
∗
1
in period t, and let
χt ≡
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ,t
ψ∗θ
. (6.2)
When the signal y can statistically identify a1, a patient player 1 can secure the following payoff when the state
is θ∗:
(1− χ0)vθ∗(α
∗
1, u1, u2) + χ0 min
a2∈A2
u1(θ
∗, α∗1, a2). (6.3)
This lower bound is meaningful when χ0 < 1, or equivalently, when λ0 ∈ Λ, in which case player 1 can secure
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a fraction 1 − χ0 of his commitment payoff. It also incorporates the finding in Fudenberg and Levine (1992),
that when player 2’s best reply against α∗1 does not depend on θ, or equivalently, χ0 = 0, player 1 can secure
his commitment payoff from α∗1.
The proof is similar to Statement 3 of Theorem 1 except that player 1 cannot perfectly control player
2s’ posterior beliefs due to imperfect monitoring. Nevertheless, χt remains a non-negative supermartingale
conditional on the probability measure induced by commitment type α∗1. According to the Doob’s Upcrossing
Inequality, the probability of the event that χt < 1 for all t is at least 1 − χ0. Therefore, type θ
∗ can secure at
least a fraction 1− χ0 of his commitment payoff from α
∗
1, regardless of his stage-game payoff function.
Non-Stationary Commitment Types: In my baseline model, conditional on the state θ ∈ Θ and the com-
mitment plan γ ∈ Γ, the committed long-run player plays the same action in every period. Thanks to this
stationarity assumption, my characterization result for attaining commitment payoff from α∗1 ∈ A
∗
1 does not
depend on commitment types playing other actions.
This is not the case when there exist commitment types that play non-stationary strategies. For example,
suppose there exists a commitment type that mixes between a′1 and a
′′
1 in period 0, and plays a
′
1 in all subsequent
periods. When examining whether player 1 can secure his commitment payoff from a′1, one needs to take into
account not only the commitment type that plays a′1 in every period and the state distribution conditional on this
commitment type, but also the commitment type that plays the aforementioned nonstationary strategy as well
as the state distribution conditional on this non-stationary type. This is because after observing a′1 in period 0,
player 2s can never distinguish this non-stationary commitment type from commitment type a′1.
One may wonder whether there exists a commitment type (possibly nonstationary), such that player 1 can
secure his optimal commitment payoff as long as this type occurs with strictly positive probability, regardless
of the presence of other commitment types. The answer to this question is negative as long as player 2’s best
reply against player 1’s optimal commitment action depends on the state. This is because the state can be
learnt only through the informed player’s action choices, not through exogenous signals. For every (potentially
non-stationary) commitment plan σ∗1 : H×Θ→ ∆(A1), one can construct another commitment plan σ
∗∗
1 that
1. occurs with significantly higher probability compared to σ∗1 ;
2. generates the same distribution over public histories as σ∗1, in another word, σ
∗
1 and σ
∗∗
1 are observation-
ally equivalent from the uninformed players’ perspective;
3. there exists a permutation τ : Θ → Θ such that σ∗1(h
t, θ) = σ∗∗1 (h
t, τ(θ)) for every (ht, θ) ∈ H × Θ,
that is, the mapping from the states to the committed long-run player’s stage-game actions is flipped.
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A Proof of Theorem 1: Statement 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
I establish Lemma 4.1 by showing (A.1) and (A.2):
{
λ ≡ (λθ)θ∈Θ ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣ ∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ
ψ∗θ
≥ 1
}
⊂ co
(
Rm+
∖
Λ
)
, (A.1)
{
λ ≡ (λθ)θ∈Θ ∈ R
m
+
∣∣∣ ∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ
ψ∗θ
≥ 1
}
⊃ co
(
Rm+
∖
Λ
)
. (A.2)
For every θ ∈ Θ, let eθ ∈ R
m
+ be anm-dimensional vector in which the entry for θ is 1 and the other entries are
0. According to the definition of ψ∗θ in (3.11), ψ
∗
θeθ /∈ Λ and ψθeθ ∈ Λ for every θ ∈ Θ
b
(α∗1,θ
∗) and ψθ < ψ
∗
θ .
First, I show (A.1). When vector λ is such that
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ
ψ∗
θ
≡ χ ≥ 1, we have:
1
χ
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗
1
,θ∗)
λθeθ =
1
χ
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗
1
,θ∗)
λθ
ψ∗θ
(
ψ∗θeθ
)
∈ co
(
Rm+
∖
Λ
)
. (A.3)
Since χ ≥ 1,
1
χ
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθeθ ≤
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθeθ ≤ λ, (A.4)
which implies that λ ∈ co
(
Rm+
∖
Λ
)
. This establishes (A.1).
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists λ /∈ Λ such that
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ
ψ∗
θ
< 1. The definition of Λ
implies the existence of 0 ≤ λ′ ≤ λ such that:
{
a∗2
}
6= arg max
a2∈A2
{
u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a2) +
∑
θ∈Θ
λ′θu2(θ, α
∗
1, a2)
}
. (A.5)
Since
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λθ
ψ∗
θ
< 1, we know that χ ≡
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λ′
θ
ψ∗
θ
< 1. Therefore, χψ∗θeθ ∈ Λ for every θ ∈
Θb(α∗1,θ∗)
. According to Assumption 2, Λ is convex, which implies that
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λ′θeθ =
1
χ
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λ′θ
ψ∗θ
(
χψ∗θeθ
)
∈ Λ. (A.6)
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According to (A.6), we have:
{
a∗2
}
= arg max
a2∈A2
{
u2(φα∗1 , α
∗
1, a2) +
∑
θ∈Θb
(α∗1,θ
∗)
λ′θu2(θ, α
∗
1, a2)
}
. (A.7)
The definition of Θb(α∗1,θ∗)
implies a contradiction between (A.5) and (A.7), which establishes (A.2).
A.2 Remaining Steps after Proposition 2: Overview
I use the conclusion of Proposition 2 to show Statement 3 Theorem 1 in two steps. In Step 1, I show that if
all entries of λ except for at most one is sufficiently small, then player 2 has a strict incentive to play a∗2 when
player 1’s average action is close to α∗1 regardless of the correlation. Let Λ
0 be the set of beliefs with this
feature. By construction, one can directly apply Proposition 2 to establish inequality (3.3).
In Step 2, I show that if player 1’s average action is close to α∗1 but player 2 does not have a strict incentive
to play a∗2, then different types of player 1’s actions must be sufficiently different. This implies that there is
significant learning about player 1’s type after observing his action choice. Formally, I show that for every
λ ∈ Λ, there exists an integerK (independent of δ) and σ̂θ∗ : H → ∆(A1) such that if player 1 plays according
to σ̂θ∗ and player 2s play their equilibrium strategy σ2, then player 2’s belief belongs to Λ
0 after at most K
periods in which she does not have a strict incentive to play a∗2.
A.3 Step 1
For every ξ > 0, a likelihood ratio vector λ is of ‘size ξ’ if there exists ψ˜ ≡ (ψ˜1, ..., ψ˜m) ∈ R
m
+ such that:
ψ˜i ∈ (0, ψi) for all i and moreover,
λ ∈
{
λ˜ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
λ˜i/ψ˜i < 1
}
⊂
{
λ˜ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣#{i|λ˜i ≤ ξ} ≥ m− 1}. (A.8)
Intuitively, λ is of size ξ if there exists a downward sloping hyperplane such that every non-negative likelihood
ratio vector below this hyperplane has at leastm−1 entries no larger than ξ. By definition, for every ξ′ ∈ (0, ξ),
if λ is of size ξ′, then it is also of size ξ. Proposition 3 establishes (3.3) when λ is of size ξ for ξ small enough.
Proposition 3. There exists ξ > 0, s.t. lim infδ→1 vθ∗(δ, µ, u1, u2) ≥ u1(θ
∗, α∗1, a
∗
2) for every λ of size ξ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Let α1(·|h
t, ωi) ∈ ∆(A1) be the equilibrium action of type ωi at history h
t. Let
Bi,a1(h
t) ≡ λi(h
t)
(
α∗1(a1)− α1(a1|h
t, ωi)
)
. (A.9)
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Recall that
α1(·|h
t) ≡
α∗1 +
∑m
i=1 λi(h
t)α1(·|h
t, ωi)
1 +
∑m
i=1 λi(h
t)
is the average action expected by player 2. For every λ ∈ Λ(α∗1, θ
∗, u2) and ǫ > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that
for every likelihood ratio vector λ˜ satisfying:
m∑
i=1
λ˜i/ψi <
1
2
(
1 +
m∑
i=1
λi/ψi
)
, (A.10)
a∗2 is player 2’s strict best reply against every {α1(·|h
t, ωi)}
m
i=1 satisfying the following two conditions
1. |Bi,a1(h
t)| < ε for all i and a1.
2.
∥∥α∗1 − α1(·|ht)∥∥ ≤ ǫ.
This is because when the prior likelihood ratio vector satisfies (A.10), a∗2 is player 2’s strict best reply when all
types of player 1 play α∗1. When ǫ and ε are both small enough, an ǫ-deviation of the average action together
with an ε-correlation between types and actions cannot overturn this strictness.
According to the Pinsker’s Inequality,
∥∥α∗1 − α1(·|ht)∥∥ ≤ ǫ is implied by d(α∗1||α1(·|ht)) ≤ ǫ2/2. Pick ǫ
and ξ small enough such that:
ǫ <
ε
2(1 + ψ)
(A.11)
and
ξ <
ε
(m− 1)(1 + ε)
. (A.12)
Suppose λi(h
t) ≤ ξ for all i ≥ 2, since
∥∥α∗1 − α1(·|ht)∥∥ ≤ ǫ, we have:
∥∥∥λ1(α∗1 − α1(a1|ht, ω1)) + m∑
i=2
λi
(
α∗1 − α1(a1|h
t, ωi)
)∥∥∥
1 + λ1 + ξ(m− 1)
≤ ǫ.
The triangular inequality implies that:
∥∥∥λ1(α∗1 − α1(a1|ht, ω1))∥∥∥ ≤ m∑
i=2
∥∥∥λi(α∗1 − α1(a1|ht, ωi))∥∥∥+ ǫ(1 + λ1 + ξ(m− 1))
≤ ξ(m− 1) + ǫ
(
1 + ψ + ξ(m− 1)
)
≤ ε. (A.13)
where the last inequality uses (A.11) and (A.12). Inequality (A.13) implies that ||B1,a1(h
t)|| ≤ ε. As a result,
for every λ of size ξ, a∗2 is player 2’s strict best reply at every history h
t satisfying d(α∗1||α1(·|h
t)) ≤ ǫ2/2.
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A.4 Step 2
I apply the conclusion of Proposition 3 to establish inequality (3.3) for every λ ∈ Λ. Recall the definition of
Bi,a1(h
t) in (A.9). According to Bayes rule, if player 1 plays a1 ∈ A
∗
1 at h
t, then
λi(h
t)− λi(h
t, a1) =
Bi,a1(h
t)
α∗1(a1)
and
∑
a1∈A∗1
α∗1(a1)
(
λi(h
t)− λi(h
t, a1)
)
≥ 0.
Let
D(ht, a1) ≡
(
λi(h
t)− λi(h
t, a1)
)m
i=1
∈ Rm.
Suppose Bi,a1(h
t) ≥ ε for some i and a1 ∈ A
∗
1, we have ||D(h
t, a1)|| ≥ ε where || · || denotes the L
2-norm.
Pick ξ > 0 small enough to meet the requirement in Proposition 3. I define two sequences of subsets of
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2), namely {Λ
k}∞k=0 and {Λ̂
k}∞k=1, recursively as follows:
• Let Λ0 be the set of likelihood ratio vectors that are of size ξ,
• For every k ≥ 1, let Λ̂k be the set of likelihood ratio vectors in Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) such that if λ(h
t) ∈ Λ̂k,
then either λ(ht) ∈ Λk−1 or, For every {α1(·|h
t, ωi)}
m
i=1 such that ||D(h
t, a1)|| ≥ ε for some a1 ∈ A
∗
1,
there exists a∗1 ∈ A
∗
1 such that λ(h
t, a∗1) ∈ Λ
k−1.
• Let Λk be the set of likelihood ratio vectors in Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) such that for every λ˜ ∈ Λ
k, there exists
ψ˜ ≡ (ψ˜1, ..., ψ˜m) ∈ R
m
+ such that: ψ˜i ∈ (0, ψi) for all i and
λ ∈
{
λ˜ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
λ˜i/ψ˜i < 1
}
⊂
( k−1⋃
j=0
Λj
)⋃
Λ̂k. (A.14)
By construction, {
λ˜ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
λ˜i/ψ˜i < 1
}
⊂
k⋃
j=0
Λj = Λk. (A.15)
Since (0, ..., ψi − υ, ..., 0) ∈ Λ
0 for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} and υ > 0, so co(Λ0) = Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2). By definition,
{Λk}k∈N is an increasing sequence with Λ
k ⊂ Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) = co(Λ
k) for any k ∈ N, i.e. it is bounded from
above by a compact set. Therefore limk→∞
⋃k
j=0Λ
j ≡ Λ∞ exists and is a subset of cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
. The
next Lemma shows that cl(Λ∞) coincides with cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
.
Lemma A.1. cl(Λ∞) = cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
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PROOF OF LEMMA A.1: Since Λk ⊂ Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) for every k ∈ N, cl(Λ
∞) ⊂ cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
. The rest
of the proof shows the other direction. Suppose toward a contradiction that
cl(Λ∞) ( cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)
(A.16)
1. Let Λ̂ ⊂ Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) be such that if λ(h
t) ∈ Λ̂, then either λ(ht) ∈ Λ∞, or for every {α1(·|h
t, ωi)}
m
i=1
such that ||D(ht, a1)|| ≥ ε for some a1 ∈ A
∗
1, there exists a
∗
1 ∈ A
∗
1 such that λ(h
t, a∗1) ∈ Λ
∞.
2. Let Λ˘ be the set of likelihood ratio vectors in Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) such that for every λ˜ ∈ Λ˘, there exists
ψ˜ ≡ (ψ˜1, ..., ψ˜m) ∈ R
m
+ such that:
ψ˜i ∈ (0, ψi) for all i and λ ∈
{
λ˜ ∈ Rm+
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
λ˜i/ψ˜i < 1
}
⊂
(
Λ∞
⋃
Λ̂
)
. (A.17)
Since Λ∞ is defined as the limit of the above operator, so in order for (A.16) to be true, it has to be the case that
Λ˘ = Λ∞, or Ξ
⋂
Λ˘ = {∅} where
Ξ ≡ cl
(
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2)
)∖
cl(Λ∞). (A.18)
One can check that Ξ is convex and has non-empty interior. For every ̺ > 0, there exists x ∈ Ξ, θ ∈ (0, π/2)
and a halfspace H(χ) ≡
{
λ˜
∣∣∣∑mi=1 λ˜i/χi ≤ χ} with φ > 0 satisfying:
1.
∑m
i=1 xi/ψi = χ.
2. ∂B(x, r)
⋂
H(χ)
⋂
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2) ⊂ Λ
∞ for every r ≥ ̺.
3. For every r ≥ ρ and y ∈ ∂B(x, r)
⋂
Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2), either y ∈ Λ
∞ or d(y,H(χ)) > r sin θ, where d(·, ·)
denotes the Hausdorff distance.
The second and third property used the non-convexity of cl(Λ∞). Suppose λ(ht) = x for some ht and there
exists a1 ∈ A
∗
1 such that ||D(h
t, a1)|| ≥ ε,
• Either λ(ht, a1) ∈ Λ
∞, in which case x ∈ Λ˘ but x ∈ Ξ, leading to a contradiction.
• Or λ(ht, a1) /∈ Λ
∞. Requirement 3 implies that d(λ(ht, a1),H(χ)) > ε sin θ. On the other hand,
∑
a′1∈A
∗
1
α∗1(a
′
1)λi(h
t, a′1) ≤ λi(h
t) (A.19)
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for every i. Requirement 1 then implies that
∑
a′1∈A
∗
1
α∗1(a
′
1)λi(h
t, a′1) ∈ H(χ), which is to say:
∑
a′1∈A
∗
1
α∗1(a
′
1)
m∑
i=1
λi(h
t, a′1)/ψi ≤ χ. (A.20)
According to Requirement 2, λ(ht, a1) /∈ H(χ), i.e.
∑m
i=1 λi(h
t, a1)/ψi > χ + εκ for some constant
κ > 0. Take
ρ ≡
1
2
min
a1∈A∗1
{α∗1(a1)}εκ,
(A.19) implies the existence of a∗1 ∈ A
∗
1\{a1} such that λ(h
t, a∗1) ∈ H(χ)
⋂
B(x, ρ). Requirement 2
then implies that x = λ(ht) ∈ Λ˘. Since x ∈ Ξ, this leads to a contradiction.
The above contradiction suggests that (A.16) cannot be true, which validates the conclusion of Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1 implies that for every λ ∈ Λ(θ∗, α∗1, u2), there exists an integer K ∈ N independent of δ such
that λ ∈ ΛK . Statement 3 of Theorem 1’ can then be shown by induction onK . According to Proposition 3, the
statement holds for K = 0. Suppose it applies to every K ≤ K∗ − 1, let us consider the case when K = K∗.
According to the construction of ΛK
∗
, there exists a strategy for player 1 such that whenever a∗2 is not player
2’s best reply despite d(α∗1‖α1(·|h
t)) < ǫ2/2, then the posterior belief after observing a1,t is in Λ
K∗−1, under
which the commitment payoff bound is attained by the induction hypothesis.
B Examples
I provide a counterexample in order to explain that when the commitment action α∗1 is mixed, λ ∈ Λ is
insufficient for a patient player 1 to secure his commitment payoff. Consider the following stage-game payoffs:
θ1 l m r
H 1, 3 0, 0 0, 0
L 2,−1 0, 0 0, 0
D 3,−1 1/2, 0 1/2, 0
θ2 l m r
H 0, 1/2 0, 3/2 0, 0
L 0, 1/2 0, 3/2 0, 0
D 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
θ3 l m r
H 0, 1/2 0, 0 0, 3/2
L 0, 1/2 0, 0 0, 3/2
D 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Let A∗1 ≡ {α
∗
1,D} with α
∗
1 ≡
1
2H +
1
2L and φα∗1 is the Dirac measure on θ1, one can apply the definitions and
obtain vθ1(α
∗
1) = 3/2 and Θ
b
(α∗1 ,θ1)
= {θ2, θ3}. If µ(α
∗
1) = 2µ(θ2) = 2µ(θ3) ≡ ρ for some ρ ∈ (0, 1/2), then
λ = (1/2, 1/2) ∈ Λ(α∗1, θ1). When δ is large enough, the following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium
in which type θ1’s payoff is 1/2:
• Strategic type θ1 plays D in every period.
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• In period 0, strategic type θ2 plays H and strategic type θ3 plays L. Starting from period 1, types θ2 and
θ3 play
1
2H +
1
2L.
• Player 2 plays m in period 0. Starting from period 1, if she observes H or D in period 0, then she plays
m in every subsequent period. If she observes L in period 0, then she plays r in every subsequent period.
In the above equilibrium, either µt(θ2)/µt(α
∗
1) or µt(θ3)/µt(α
∗
1) increases in period 0 regardless of player 1’s
action. As a result, the likelihood ratio vector in period 1 does not belong to Λ(α∗1, θ1) with probability 1. This
provides type θ1 a rationale for not playing l and gives him an incentive to play D in every subsequent period,
making player 2’s belief self-fulfilling. This situation only arises when α∗1 is mixed and the number of bad
states is no fewer than 2.
References
[1] Aumann, Robert and Michael Maschler (1995) Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, MIT Press.
[2] Chung, Kai-Lai (1974) A Course in Probability Theory, Third Edition, Elsevier.
[3] Darby, Michael and Edi Karni (1973) “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,” Journal of
Law and Economics, 16(1), 67-88.
[4] Deb, Joyee and Yuhta Ishii (2019) “Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring,” Working Paper.
[5] Dekel, Eddie and Drew Fudenberg (1990) “Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 52(2), 243-267.
[6] Ekmekci, Mehmet and Lucas Maestri (2019) “Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with
Irreversible Actions,” Working Paper.
[7] Evans, Robert and Jonathan Thomas (1997) “Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With
Two Long-Run Players,” Econometrica, 65(5), 1153-1173.
[8] Fudenberg, Drew, David Kreps and David Levine (1988) “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refine-
ments,” Journal of Economic Theory, 354-380.
[9] Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1983) “Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon
Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 31(2), 251-268.
[10] Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1989) “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient
Player,” Econometrica, 57(4), 759-778.
[11] Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1992) “Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly
Observed,” Review of Economic Studies, 59(3), 561-579.
[12] Gossner, Olivier (2011) “Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation,” Econometrica, 79(5), 1627-1641.
32
[13] Hart, Sergiu (1985) “Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,” Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 10(1), 117-153.
[14] Ho¨rner, Johannes, Stefano Lovo and Tritan Tomala (2011) “Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incom-
plete Information: Characterization and Existence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146(5), 1770-1795.
[15] Jehiel, Philippe and Larry Samuelson (2012) “Reputation with Analogical Reasoning,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 127(4), 1927-1969.
[16] Kaya, Ayc¸a (2009) “Repeated Singalling Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 841-854.
[17] Nelson, Phillip (1970) “Information and Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 78(2), 311-
329.
[18] Pei, Harry (2020) “Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values,” Econometrica, forthcoming.
[19] Pe¸ski, Marcin (2014) “Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Discounting,” Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 9, 651-694.
[20] Wolitzky, Alexander (2011) “Indeterminacy of Reputation Effects in Repeated Games with Contracts,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 595-607.
[21] Yang, Geyu (2019) “Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring,” Working Paper.
33
